Telecommunications are one of the basic building blocks of a modern economy. In a world of globalized competition, economic development can be hamstrung by inferior telecommunications. But the formation of telecommunications policy poses a difficult challenge for authoritarian regimes: While improvements in telecommunications can contribute to material prosperity, and by extension, political legitimacy, they may also contribute to a loss of control over information flows and enhance the ability of challengers to organize against the incumbent regime.
These opposing tendencies are manifest in contemporary North Korea. The country's dilapidated telecommunications capability lags well behind world standards.
The country's physical infrastructure is lacking and decrepit, with a considerable share of the general infrastructure dating back to the Japanese colonial period. Most of the modern infrastructure installed by Soviets or based on Soviet or Chinese designs are from the 1950s and 1960s. For security purposes, much of the power and telecom transmission network is buried, hampering successful maintenance. If ever there were a country that could benefit from a telecommunications upgrade, it is the DPRK.
The country faces both external and self-imposed internal constraints on telecommunications modernization, however. Externally, North Korea is one of the few remaining socialist states and the most militarized country in the world. It is embroiled in a diplomatic conflict over its nuclear ambitions. The upshot is that it is subject to Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) restrictions under the Wassenaar Agreement, impeding its ability to import state-of-the-art technology.
More fundamentally, government policies reveal an ambivalent attitude, driven by conflicting goals of modernization and control. In an attempt to make a great leap forward, the government has seized upon the promotion of information technology as a strategic priority, with P'yongyang at the top of a vertical technology hierarchy. Yet the regime repeatedly reverses field when its insecurity and instinct for control trumps development, as illustrated by the country's multiple false starts in establishing its cellular phone network, the single most frequently identified problem in doing business in North Korea in a recent survey of Chinese businesses operating there. What emerges is the primacy of political over economic concerns. Policy implicitly regards telecommunications development as a means of earning hard currency rents rather than as a tool to enhance economic efficiency and competitiveness. This paper reviews the state of North Korea's telecommunications infrastructure, though the data invoked should be considered highly provisional. Most of the information is regarded as a state secret, and some data maintained from putatively authoritative sources (e.g., statistics reported through the United Nations system) are probably estimates or have been fabricated by reporting sources. The paper also provides a brief history of North Korean telecommunications policies in a variety of settings, paying particular attention to the recent decision to authorize yet another foreign cellular provider, in this instance the Egyptian firm Orascom Telecom, to provide nationwide cellular service, potentially leapfrogging from North Korea's dilapidated existing systems to a modern system. The theme that emerges from this review is of a government that tends to place a higher value on political control than on economic development.
Attempts at modernization are subject to reversal at times of heightened insecurity over loss of control, yet the Orascom deal holds forth the prospect of things working out differently this time.
INFRASTRUCTURE Landlines
North Korea reports having approximately 1.1 million phone lines, amounting to less than five mainlines per 100 inhabitants. Most of these are installed in government offices, collective farms, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with only perhaps 10 percent controlled by individuals or households. While there are perhaps 400 dedicated networks among SOEs, according to one eyewitness at least as recently as 2002 some significant facilities (in the power generation and grid network) were still using hand-cranked phones for communications (Hayes 2005) .
Officials of the (North) Korea Post and Telecommunications system have enunciated a goal of having land lines in nearly every home within four or five years, and in 2003 cadres were allowed to use telephones in their homes, a privilege that was eventually extended to others (Kang 2003 , Moon 2008 . However, in fall 2007, North Korean authorities reportedly concerned over "information leakage" began to tighten restrictions on phone use and to disconnect the lines of households generating charges above a certain threshold on the theory that such a volume of usage signaled that the phone was being used for trading activities (Kwon 2007 , Moon 2008 , Good Friends 2008 .
North Korea is slowly making the transition from manual switching to automatic switching systems. In the mid-1990s, an automated exchange system based on an E-10A system produced by Alcatel joint-venture factories in China was installed in P'yongyang.
While toll calls are still mostly using manual switching, North Koreans announced in 1997 that automated switching had replaced manual switching in P'yongyang and 70 other locales (Lee 2003 years beginning in 1995 (Noland and Flake 1997) . 2 The company was also eventually given rights to operate a nationwide cellular network as discussed below.
In line with further developments in the RSETZ, Loxley planned to make a $28 million investment to modernize telecom facilities in the zone. This included the creation of a 95km fiber-optic cable between Rajin-Sunbong and the Chinese city of Hunchun, eventually to be linked to P'yongyang via Ch'ongjin and Hamhung. One plan envisioned
Loxley installing 400,000 mainlines at the cost of $500 million. However, the zone did not take off as planned, and Loxley installed only 5000 fixed mainlines, providing the capacity for 1,200 mobile phones, 1,500 radio pager lines, and 80 public phones (Lee 2003) . Loxley reduced its commitment and in recent years its vestigial presence was reportedly generating around $1 million annually in revenues (Martin 2005 Korea's alleged highly enriched uranium nuclear weapons program, a charge that the company denies (Lintner 2006) . DPRK depends on satellite networks to connect to Japan and the United States.
International Connections
According to Yoon and Lee (2001) (Yonhap 2008) . Foreign residents in P'yongyang complain that service is expensive and spotty, though it is hoped that at least the quality of service will improve with Orascom's investment.
Other forms of wireless technology do not have a major presence. Use of satellite phones is limited to some foreign humanitarian aid NGOs and there is limited use of GPS.
Information technology
International Internet access is via a fiber-optic cable connecting P'yongyang with (Yonhap 2004 ). However, a subsequent report described a crackdown by security services, which considered these a threat to society (Reuters 2007) .
Reflecting these concerns about spiritual pollution, North Korea is working with China to develop firewall systems that would permit less-restricted access to the World Wide Web while allowing officials to proscribe content. A German affiliate of the North Korean government computer center has reportedly also been contracted to provide such services. It is likely that private access will gradually expand subject to this firewall, perhaps with commercially oriented services in the KIC forming the leading edge.
The DPRK government has a long history of engaging in varied and illicit commerce. Some have expressed concerns that as its Internet capability expands, the DPRK may become a location for servers hosting child pornography websites as a way of making money, as well as increasing its capabilities in cyberwarfare (Brown 2004 , Lee 2005 ).
DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN?
The Orascom conglomerate is a kind of Egyptian chaebol: Founded in 1950 by Onsi Sawiris, his three sons run the group's three principal divisions, Orascom Construction, Orascom Telecommunication, and Orascom Hotels and Development, respectively.
Orascom Telecommunication has earned a reputation for making money in challenging environments, and is one of the leading cell phone service providers in sub-Saharan Africa.
In Lastly, since bottoming out in 1998, the North Korean economy has experienced a decade of slow, uneven growth, accompanied by widening income inequality. These trends imply that there is presumably rising demand for equipment and services among the nouveau riche. Yoon and Lee (2001) provide some illustrative projections.
In short, one can identify potential consumers who would benefit from improved telecommunications. But a recurring leitmotif in this discussion has been the capriciousness of North Korean policy, and its penchant for expropriating, directly or indirectly, investors. In game-theoretic terms, the issue is whether sufficient incentives exist to encourage the North Korean government to maintain its commitments to Orascom, and not defect from the agreement, explicitly or implicitly. Moreover, if the deal were to succeed, it might improve the likelihood of other infrastructural investments such as trans-Korean pipelines or railways being implemented. A reduction in tensions through successful conclusion of the Six Party Talks would reduce North Korea's insecurity externally and perhaps encourage a more relaxed attitude in its internal practices.
So one can build a case that things may be different this time: that there are enough internal players that stand to benefit, the deal is structured in such a way that there are real penalties associated with defection, and changes in the external environment could alter the parameters of the regime's calculus in a cooperative direction.
CONCLUSIONS
Telecommunications are universally acknowledged as a major contributor to economic development. But they represent a double-edged sword for authoritarian regimes: The economic benefits associated with telecommunications can be a source of legitimacy, while telecommunications can also facilitate opposition.
A recurring leitmotif in this review of North Korean telecommunications is the tendency of the regime to act capriciously, prioritizing political over economic objectives, and treating telecommunications development as an easy way to skim rents, rather than as a building block of economic development. For example, in its negotiations over telecommunications services in the KIC, the North insisted on emphasizing links between Seoul and P'yongyang over linking KIC tenants to the South (Lim 2007) . It also appears to regard telecoms less as a means of boosting productivity, efficiency, and competitiveness than as an easy way to extract hard currency rents for the central government, without significantly altering existing practices, a stance that North Korea has exhibited on a range of issues. Lim (2007) , in the context of an otherwise-upbeat depiction of the KIC, describes how in the name of "communications sovereignty" P'yongyang insisted on controlling the KIC communications network in order to force South Korean firms to place calls to the South through an international third party (and thus garnering higher fees for the North Korean government), a tactic that they replicated at Mt. Kumgang. The problems are not limited to KIC: In a recent survey of Chinese businesses operating in North Korea, the ban on cell phones, weak infrastructure, and changing rules were the three most frequently cited obstacles to doing business there.
Yet the regime continues to signal interest in technological upgrading, exploring the possibility of international exchange and cooperation in the telecoms field (Yim 2008 ). Whether these moves constitute another attempt to solve policy problems with technology or whether they indicate a serious re-think of the country's approach to telecommunications remains to be seen. North Korea recently entered into a deal with Orascom Telecoms to provide nationwide cell phone service. If fully realized, the Orascom venture would represent a major foreign investment in the North Korean economy, yet given North Korea's past opportunistic policies it is reasonable to wonder whether this initiative will also come a cropper. There is at least a plausible case to be made that this time things will work out differently: Improvements in the country's telecommunications are badly needed, Orascom may have woven a sufficient web to bind the North Koreans to the agreement, and in the context of generally favorable trends in external relations, a successful outcome could have a favorable knock-on precedential effect with respect to future infrastructural deals.
